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Freedom and Matter: From Kant to
Fichte
Aaron Wells
1 Fichte's mature conception of transcendental freedom is the subject of some controversy.
1 This paper hopes to shed light on Fichte's later conception by examining his earliest
thoughts on the matter.  The focus is  on three pivotal  years of  Fichte's development,
1791-93. 
2  During  these  years,  Fichte  had  a  number  of  interlocutors.  But  Kant  was  of  central
importance.  Thus  I  begin with a  discussion of  Fichte's  reflections  on how a  broadly
Kantian conception of transcendental freedom can be manifest in the empirical world.
However, Fichte's moves at this point are broadly unsatisfactory, even dogmatic, from a
Kantian perspective. 
3  However, in several short works from 1792, Fichte's views become significantly more
sophisticated.  Fichte confronts the worry that  neither a metaphysical  account of  the
natural world, nor a mere appeal to ‘facts of consciousness,’ can be sufficient to establish
autonomy in the positive sense. 
4 Fichte responds to these worries in two ways. One, relatively well known, is his attempt to
prove the existence of practical reason from features of self-consciousness. I focus instead
on Fichte's account of moral motivation added to the 1793 second edition of the Attempt at
a Critique of all Revelation. There, Fichte sketches an account of pure practical motivation
that does not depend on direct appeal to features of self-consciousness, but is more in line
with Kant's own appeal to the moral law.
 
A. 1791: Fichte’s Earliest Account of Freedom 
5  Kant’s first conception of freedom in the 1760s was compatibilist. He argues in the New
Elucidation free human actions are spontaneous just because they issue from “an inner
principle”  (New  Elucidation 1:402).  They  are  “called  forth  by...motives  of  the
understanding applied to  the will,  whereas  in  the case  of  brute  animals  or  physico-
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mechanical actions everything is necessitated in conformity with external stimuli and
impulses...” (NE 1:401). For the early Kant, then, to show that I am free it would suffice to
show that my series of representations is causally self-contained – not in interaction with
anything “outside.”  Under the influence of  Crusius,  Kant  quickly came to doubt  this
hypothesis: for even a lonely monad could be entirely determined in a lawlike way. 
6  Additionally, by the early 1770s, especially in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Kant came to worry
about any account of the causal interaction between the inner properties and those of
spatial experience. That is: if inner properties are really not spatial in any sense, how
could they have physical effects? How could my desires, for instance, lead to me raising
my arm? Kant does not think efficient causality as such is a deep mystery. The success of
Newtonian physics, by his lights, outweighs skeptical doubts about determinism. Yet the
example  of  physics  makes  the  problem  of  inner  properties  apparent.  The  law  of
gravitation, for instance, makes essential reference to distance. Therefore it presupposes
some account of space. The same is true of other kinds of interaction among bodies, such
as collision. We have no determinate idea of what non-spatial efficient causality would be
like. 
7  As  is  well  known,  while  Kant’s  transcendental  idealism is  a  theoretical  account,  its
practical import is of central importance. It is intended to make metaphysical room for
undetermined agents, which would be transcendentally free. For Kant, lack of external
determination is a necessary but not sufficient condition for autonomy. 
8  Fichte was a careful if idiosyncratic reader of Kant. Developmentally, Fichte seems to
have become concerned with the first question around the time he first read Kant. His
sketch of a response in the 1791 Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation appeals to the matter [
Materie] of the world of experience – though as I  suggest below, Fichte’s argument is
vulnerable to Kantian objections. 
9  He keenly appreciates the connection between revelation (and other divine action) and a
Kantian metaphysics of transcendental freedom. Both involve the causal influence of a
spontaneous,  non-physical  being  on  the  deterministic  natural  order.2 For  as  Fichte
defines the concept, revelation would be “an effect produced by God in the sensuous
world by means of supernatural causality” (ACR 144; passage omitted in second edition). 
10  Yet following Kant,  Fichte notes that free finite beings could also “through freedom
become a cause in the sensuous world” (ACR 146; passage omitted in second edition). This
makes empirical  identification of revelation virtually impossible even if  one could be
certain that it is not due to the laws of spatiotemporal nature. For, to put it simply, one
cannot ever be sure that a given experience originates in God, and not in finite freedom.
Fichte makes an apparent exception for the pure feeling of respect for the moral law, but
this evidently does not conform to typical doctrinal conceptions of revelation. 
11  Some of Fichte’s remarks seem to suggest a picture on which the laws of nature are up to
our own constructive activity. However, while laws do depend on categories and forms of
intuition, they are necessary and not freely constructed (ACR 15 / SW V:23;  added in
second  edition).  Fichte  in  fact  claims  that  no  object  is  determinable  by  absolute
spontaneity except the form of our own faculty of desire, which can be freely determined
in actual volitions, as “empirical determination[s]” (ACR 16 / SW V:25; added in second
edition). 
12  So, even if one grants transcendental freedom to finite agents, the question is then how
it can have effects in the natural world. There is only one solution, Fichte suggests:
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Their effects in the world of sense...do meet and must not contradict each other,
unless either natural cognition [Naturerkenntnis], on the one hand, or the causality
of freedom required by practical reason in the world of sense, on the other, is to be
impossible.  Now  the  possibility  of  this  agreement  of  two  legislations  entirely
independent of each other can be conceived in no other way than by their common
dependence on a higher legislation that underlies both but which is  completely
inaccessible to us. If  we were able to take its principle as a basis for a world view,
then...one and the same effect...appears to us in relation to the world of sense as
free according to the moral law, and when attributed to the causality of reason,
appears in nature as contingent. But...we are not able to do so… (ACR 88 / SW V:108). 
13 Fichte’s appeal to a conceivable divine standpoint at this stage departs in a subtle but
important way from Kant. For Kant, one need not appeal to any higher legislation to
safeguard the theoretical  possibility  that  freedom and spatiotemporal  law are not  in
conflict. The resolution of the Third Antinomy, that is, requires no appeal to a divine or
supersensible perspective. Such a perspective instead enters into Kant’s projects of moral
theology in the third Critique and beyond.
14 By  contrast,  Fichte  appeals  to  a  divine  worldview  regarding  the  mere  theoretical
possibility of effects of freedom in the natural world. 
15  Yet Fichte denies that we can take up the higher standpoint. We can only conceive such a
standpoint. That is, we could never occupy a position from which nature and freedom are
part of a single legislation. Therefore, Fichte suggests, we must assume
that not all appearances in the world of sense are necessary according to natural
laws alone, but rather that many of them are only contingent; and that accordingly
we must  not  explain them all  from the laws of  nature,  but  some rather merely
according  to natural  laws.  To  explain  something  according  to  natural  laws,  however,
means to assume the causality of the matter of the effect to be outside nature, but
the causality of the form of the effect to be within nature. All appearances in the
world of sense must be capable of explanation according to the laws of nature, for
otherwise they could never become an object of knowledge. (ACR 88-9; SW V:108)
16 Fichte’s suggestion is that scientific laws are formal, leaving some matter undetermined. 
17  One way to interpret this is traditional and metaphysical. One can interpret the matter in
question as part of the actual material world. In particular, this matter might be thought
of as the ‘initial conditions’ of the actual world (supposing there are any). The same set of
natural  laws  will  have  very  different  effects  across  time  depending  on  the  initial
conditions.
18  The Fichte of the Attempt certainly seems interested in this sort of picture. He suggests
that we can conceive – but not occupy – a God’s-eye point of view, from which 
nothing  is  natural  and  nothing  supernatural,  nothing...necessary  and  nothing
contingent, nothing is possible and nothing actual. Negatively we can assert this
much for certain, obliged by the laws of our thought; but if we wanted to determine
the modality of his understanding positively, we would become transcendent. So
there can be no question at all concerning how God could conceive of a supernatural
effect in the world of sense as possible and how he could actually do it; but rather
how  we  are  able  to  conceive  of  an  appearance  as  effected  by  a  supernatural
causality of God. (ACR 89).
19 There are a number of Kantian worries about such an approach. First, Fichte might seem
to skip over more ‘modest’ responses to the issue. That is, he takes it that only the idea of
something radically beyond a number of theoretically essential concepts can make even
the possibility of freedom coherent. Despite Kant’s own dabblings with the intuitive
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intellect late in the third Critique, he does not take any such speculation to be required for
conceiving the mere possibility of freedom. 
20  Second, for all the ambition of his claims, Fichte gives us little help in using this idea to
foster our own speculative perspective on nature and freedom. That is, he confidently
claims we can know “how God could conceive” the solution to the relevant problems: but
do we know this? And if so, what use is it to us? 
21  Third, Fichte ends up seeming committed to many appearances being “only contingent”
and not falling under the laws of nature whatsoever. That is, his attempt to vindicate
transcendental freedom seems to undermine the explanatory autonomy of science. And I
tend to doubt Fichte would let science fall this way (even if it is of far less philosophical
interest for him than for Kant or Schelling). 
22  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  Fichte  at  most  provides  what  Kant  would  consider
necessary conditions for genuine autonomy. For Kant, autonomy involves a legislative
ability to grasp and apply the moral law, as well as an executive capacity to initiate acts in
accordance with the moral law.3 Yet this seems to involve at least the possibility of self-
conscious purposiveness, which a mere metaphysical account of negative freedom cannot
provide. 
 
B. 1792: Two Reviews and Fichte’s Doubts
23  In two important reviews published in 1792 – of ‘Aenesidemus’ and F. H. Gebhard – Fichte
registers significant doubts with his earliest published account of freedom. 
24  With Schulze’s  publication of  the ‘Aenesidemus’  essay in 1792 Fichte became highly
concerned  with  the  effects  of  the  matter  [Stoff]  of  intuition (i.e.,  sensation) on  our
theoretical spontaneity, as seen in his review. This became a central preoccupation in the
development of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. As such, it will be helpful to briefly examine
both Schulze’s claims and 
25  Schulze’s  ‘Aenesidemus’  was  very  influential  in  renewing  interest  in  theoretical
skepticism  among  the  German  Idealists,  raising  the  problem  of  ‘givenness’  and  the
unknown causes of our representations. However, Schulze himself never formulates the
problem in the terms adopted by Fichte, and it seems fair to say that the questions the
review provoked in Fichte far outrun Schulze’s actual philosophical claims.
26  Fichte asserts in his review that practical and theoretical philosophy take the “same
steps” in different directions; a critical, transcendental philosophy will avoid the pitfalls
both of popular philosophical theoretical realism and popular philosophical action theory
(EPW 75-6). Still, until its final pages, Fichte’s review largely focuses on theoretical issues.
27  Let’s begin with the problem as Schulze sees it. In Reinhold, and by extension Kantian
philosophy in general, Schulze finds an uncritical acceptance of a “something” which is
“the cause and condition of the actuality of representations” (FKtH 108). Here Schulze
seems to run together various Kantian concepts, such as the unknown ground of the fact
of representation in Reinhold and the unknown affecting cause(s) of sensation in Kant.
For Schulze, there is merely a classical skeptical problem here. As Schulze correctly notes,
the ‘somethings’ in question cannot be determinately known. How, Schultze then asks,
can we be sure that they exist (FKtH 108)?
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28  Fichte has a different reading of the problem. He worries that causal affection by an
unknown objective ground threatens to make reference and intelligibility more generally
depend on an unintelligible brute given. If this really is what Reinhold and Beck think,
Fichte  reasons,  their  philosophical  projects  would  be  seriously  undermined.  Where
Schulze  was  basically  an  empirical  skeptic,  Fichte’s  worries  concern  deep  structural
features of Kantian philosophy. 
29  Fichte’s frequent references to matter in this regard draw on some of Kant’s technical
terminology. Kant claimed that sensation is the matter of intuition. Sensation can mostly
be characterized negatively. Form and matter are relative terms. Sensation is the matter
of intuition. 
30  What of sensation itself? In Kant’s technical sense, sensation as such is not ‘for’ conscious
subjects.  It  is  sub-personal,  like  the  models  involved  in  the  course  of  our  visual
processing. So its laws are not reflectively accessible to us. One positive point Kant does
make clear is that sensation is the result of causal affection which is not up to us.4 
31  ‘Matter’  in fact  translates two terms in Fichte’s  German.  When Fichte speaks of  the
subject-matter of physics and the sciences, or the relative correlate of form, he often uses
Materie. With respect to the Kantian sense, where matter is prior to all synthesis, even of
space  and time,  Fichte  often uses  Stoff.  This  is  the  term that  usually  appears  in  his
technical philosophical works, such as the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre.5 
32  Kant  himself  does  not  explicitly  appeal  to  matter  in  his  account  of  transcendental
freedom.6 
33 The ‘matter’ of experience, through which we cognize effects, is intuition. Intuitions are
temporal, and subject to causality.  So this cannot be construed as a ‘gap’  in Kantian
nature, where freedom finds a way in. In the third Critique and beyond, Kant does develop
accounts of matter that may go beyond space and time, for instance in his discussion of
genius. The beauty of products of genius can be grounded not in rules, or determinate
concepts, but only “that which is merely nature in the subject...namely, the supersensible
substrate” (CJ 5:344). Kant maintains that genius is still rooted in what is natural, agential,
and even rational – though the nature of this grounding is unknown to us. Still, Kant
seems  open  to  the  possibility  that  the  grounds  of  sensation,  which  are  basically
unknowable from the empirical perspective, could be effects of supersensible activity. 
34  Fichte is aware of relative uses of ‘matter’ and ‘form’ in Kant (ACR 15 / SW V:23). He
generally uses Materie in this relative sense,  and Stoff to refer to what is prior to all
synthesis – feeling or sensation – in abstraction from all normative contributions of the
understanding. Thus what he has in mind is not the subject-matter of physics, defined in
terms of laws. The term simply picks out what we causally ground in abstraction from
nomological specification.7 
35  Let  us  return  to  Fichte’s  ‘Aenesidemus’  review.  He  clearly  thinks  Schulze  never
appreciated the depth of the problems touched on in his own essay. Epistemologically,
Schulze assumes it would make sense for the normativity of the forms of judgment to
simply result from a causal process as such, absent any further lawlike specification (EPW
68-9).  Now,  Fichte  need  not  deny  causal  affection  entirely.  But  a  mere  causal,
informational,  or  sense-datum account  leaves  propositional  normativity  inexplicable.
Fichte’s  difficult  example  from  the  review  concerns  the  reason  why  perceptual
experiences must be regarded as actual. Schulze suggested such reasons could simply be
given in perceptual experience itself.  The idea that the phenomenology of perception
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involves  a  distinctive  immediacy has  enjoyed considerable  popularity  since  Schulze’s
time. But the mere immediate quality of perception seems quite insufficient – for surely
the bee’s perceptions are immediate for it as well. 
36  Metaphysically, Fichte suggests that a position like Schulze’s might as well be Spinozism.
For it makes the unknown “not-self” into “the real ground of everything,” and we arrive
at “Spinoza’s fatalism” (H&L 146). If Kant had assumed causal affection in the way Schulze
accused,  Fichte  suggests  in  a  1797  letter  to  Reinhold,  Kant  would  be  “in  utter
contradiction with himself, and this would be obvious to everyone” (EPR, 420). While I can
hardly consider Fichte’s numerous discussions of this issue here, he usually seems to deny
that  Kant  endorses  causal  affection  in  the  way  Schulze  suggests.  For  example,  he
explicitly claims in the ‘Second Introduction’ to the Wissenschaftslehre that on “Kant’s
view” as well as Fichte’s own, knowledge does not proceed from “affection by an object”
(to the, H&L 60).
37  However, from this perspective one might worry about Fichte’s claims in the first edition
of the Attempt that we must think the entire world as a supernatural effect of God, and its
matter as potentially supernatural effects of freedom – even if this is a matter of faith and
not objective certainty. For if the form or laws of the world are thought as an effect that is
itself lawless or ‘supernatural,’ some form of Spinozism threatens. Similarly, one might
worry that the effects of freedom in the world, even if they are stipulated to be ‘ours,’ are
deeply inscrutable,  rather like the “hidden root” of all  representation appealed to in
Reinhold and J.S. Beck. Yet the ‘Aenesidemus’ review and the new edition of the Attempt 
already begin to tackle responses to this problem: that sensation or feeling has a strictly
circumscribed role in moral psychology and theoretical justification. Moreover, this role
can be transcendentally specified in a way that abstracts from the ‘hidden’ causal origins of
sensation or feeling. 
38  I take Fichte himself to allow for an empirical story on which there is causal affection
underlying sensation.  In  the  1794 “Concerning the  Concept  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre”
Fichte explicitly contrasts that project with that of the empirical sciences. The question of
outer determination of mental acts cannot “occur within the Wissenschaftslehre itself” (
EPW 120). Nonetheless, this is hardly an unintelligible question. In fact, since it concerns
lawlike determination, it must be a matter for “the particular sciences” (EPW 120). This
causal story is a mere empirical matter of fact. In questions quid juris, it plays no role.
From the transcendental standpoint, causal affection plays no role in experience. This is
what  licenses  strong  (and  often  misleading)  Fichtean  claims  that  even  feeling  is
dependent on the activity of the ‘I’: he means that feeling for us requires the activity of
the ‘I,’  and from a transcendental  perspective one cannot  even cogently speaking of
feeling apart from its being for us.8 
39  One might object that Kant seemingly does posit a ‘real ground’ of sensation in certain
passages.9 In  fact,  many  interpreters  of  Fichte  from  Hegel  onwards  have  taken  the
Fichtean Anstoss to itself be a transcendental real ground – something like the thing in
itself, or even a mechanical cause affecting the subject.10 More charitable readings of both
Kant and Fichte are available, however. On Fichte’s own interpretation of the Critical
Kant, reality is an empirical and ‘human’ matter for anthropology; the real in sensation
can be ‘anticipated,’ but only by calling attention to features of space and time as such. So
the ‘matter’ of sensation plays no substantive role in Kant’s transcendental epistemology.
Similarly, Fichte refers to the Anstoss in a highly indeterminate way, even though in each
actual empirical case it is determinate ‘factive’ consciousness.
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40  Fichte sometimes casts himself as simply working out and justifying Kant’s insights. as he
writes to Niethammer in 1793, “whoever shows us how Kant arrived at this substrate
without extending the causal law beyond its limits will have understood Kant” (EPW 369).
Up to a point, Kant would be entirely in agreement with Fichte’s claims, given his denial
of any substantive transcendental role for the ground of sensory affection. However, it
must  be  stressed  that  Fichte  sharply  breaks  with  Kant  regarding  ‘empirical’  and
‘transcendental’ questions of freedom. For Fichte, what Kant considered mere empirical
spontaneity  –  whether  theoretical  or  practical  –  becomes  a  central  question  for
transcendental  philosophy.  By  contrast,  the  question  of  metaphysical transcendental
freedom as a causal power, which is at the heart of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, in
Fichte quickly becomes regarded as a question for the empirical sciences, not philosophy.
11 
41  However, Kantian doubts about such a program might remain: one could worry that
Fichte fails to exclude substantial metaphysical threats to our merely negative freedom
from  external  determination.  Does  this  mean  Fichte’s  position  is  dogmatic,  from  a
Kantian point of view?12 It is unclear that Fichte’s position need conflict with Kant’s; in
fact, Fichte may turn away from the metaphysics of transcendental freedom because he
took Kant to have said all that was needed on the subject.13 It is very possible – if far from
certain – that in his last writings Kant himself  aimed to revisit  the relation between
theoretical spontaneity and causal affection.14 Kant’s project there can be seen not as an
uncritical  attempt at  a  priori  physics,  but  as  seeking to specify in greater detail  the
conditions of cognitive activity under which sensation comes to play a justificatory role.
42  But leaving Kant’s late work aside, it is worth noting that Fichte addresses such issues –
at least to some degree – in his review of Gebhard’s On Ethical Goodness as Disinterested
Benevolence.15 Fichte is largely uninterested in the details of this work, rather viewing it as
an occasion for reflection on the Kantian theory of freedom and motivation. 
43  Much of Gebhard’s work purports to defend Kant against a theory of morality based on a
disinterested or benevolent drive, as defended in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Fichte  regards  both  Smithian  moral  psychology  and  Gebhard’s  responses as  crude.
However, he takes the discussion to get at a deep threat to the Kantian system.
44  We  are  to  consider  the  hypothesis  that  our  motivation  towards  what  is  right  is  a
primitive  drive  which  “cannot  be  derived  from something  higher,  and  indeed,  from
practical reason” (RevG 303). This hypothesis is basically Humean, since it denies pure
practical reason any ultimate motivational force. Instead, on this hypothesis our ‘actions’
are ultimately just  the product of  a  contest  of  force between drives.  Yet  we are not
directly aware of this context – and perhaps cannot be. Thus it is unsurprising that the
later  Hume  turns  away  from  psychological  self-analysis,  and  towards  a  descriptive
program concerning our practices of praise and blame.16 
45  Per Fichte, it is not sufficient to object to this hypothesis that it “provides no ground for
assuming the freedom of the will” (i.e.,  autonomy as a Kantian capacity to grasp the
moral law) (RevG 304). For as Kant himself remarked in the second Critique, the ground or
ratio essendi of the moral law is precisely autonomy in this sense. That is, if one denies any
need for the legislative role of pure practical reason in morality, one “can get along very
well without freedom” in the relevant Kantian sense (RevG 304). 
46  More troubling still, such a hypothesis is seemingly compatible with familiar aspects of
moral or motivational experience. 
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Genuine  morality  would  of  course  be  destroyed,  and we would  once  again  find
ourselves  fastened  to  the  chain  of  natural  necessity,  but  the  facts  of  our
consciousness would nevertheless be explained satisfactorily and with the utmost
consistency; everything that is incomprehensible within the Kantian system would
be eliminated and such [Kantian] morality would be shown to be an illusion. (RevG
304)
47 That is,  the Humean hypothesis cannot be ruled out by appeal to immediate facts of
common moral understanding. For as Fichte stresses, the hypothesis is quite compatible
with an irreducible but non-motivational role for reason. The facts of consciousness alone
cannot decide whether practical reason really exists, or whether the Humean hypothesis
is in fact true. 
48  Indeed, Fichte seems to suggest that Kant’s account of theoretical cognition is basically
compatible with its having no motivational role.17 Instead, reason would be constituted so
as to anticipate and help bring about “happiness,” where this  term is  understood as
picking out the “ultimate goal” of our nature, of which we have no knowledge (RevG 304).
49  Interestingly,  it  need  not  be  the  case  that  on  such  a  picture,  agents  are  entirely
determined by external factors. For it seemingly remains the case that our actions are
determined by our essence or nature – though without any conscious or rational grasp
that or how this occurs. Here Fichte appears deeply skeptical concerning the apparent
spontaneity of theoretical reason (which may even include “the transformation of the
feeling of ‘must’ into the feeling of ‘ought’” (RevG 305)). This appearance of empirical
spontaneity might simply be the result of ignorance of certain application conditions. 
50  Fichte concludes by claiming that in a genuinely Kantian system, “it must be proven that
reason is practical” – that is, that pure reason has motivational force (RevG 305). Here
Fichte sketches such a proof, based on an appeal to the unity of self-consciousness. This
unity must  be in some sense unconditioned;  yet  only pure practical  reason could be
unconditioned in this sense – or so Fichte argues. This move foreshadows the arguments
of his more famous Wissenschaftslehre.18 However, we will put such proofs aside here, in
order to focus on the sections Fichte added to the second edition of the Attempt. For there,
Kant links the problems discussed in two reviews of 1792, but does not directly tackle the
question of proving that reason can determine the will. 
 
C. 1793: Fichte’s Revised Account of Freedom
51  Fichte’s newly added section purports to provide a theory of the will.  Fichte defines
volition  as  the  power  “to  determine  oneself  to  produce  a  representation  with  the
consciousness of one’s own activity” (ACR 9 / SW V:16). Volition is the actualization of the
faculty of desire. For one can have a desire that does not determine the will. 
52  Fichte’s definition of volition begins with a distinction between two distinct aspects: “a
representation” and “the consciousness of one’s own activity.” Of course, there is a sense
in which the consciousness of one’s own activity could be described as a representation.
But  it  is  precisely  not  the  sort  of  representation  involved  in theoretical  belief  or
cognition.
53  Thus Fichte claims that on the one hand, volition must take place with respect to some
representational content, as when I imagine the soup I plan to order later. For Fichte, this
content need not be cognitive: even sensation can be an ‘objective’ aspect of volition in
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this  sense.  However,  Fichte  recognizes  that  mere  theoretical  representation  of  this
content seemingly cannot move one to act.19
54 Instead, volition involves an additional, conative aspect, which is not at all manifest in
what is representationally given to consciousness. The seeming fact of “consciousness of
self-activity,” Fichte allows, could simply arise from ignorance of unknown but genuinely
determining causes (ACR 14 / SW V:16). That is, consciousness of self-activity in volition
may well be deceptive. A plausible way to read the ‘deception’ is as concerning a gap
between the lived experience of choice and spontaneity, and causal facts that would make
it  possible.  While  in  that  case  there  would  be  no  willing  at  all,  Fichte  is  so  far
presupposing that there is a will (ACR 14 / SW V:22). 
55  However,  the  representational  material  or  content  already  raises  a  number  of
philosophical issues. For it could be that one “self-actively produces” such material (ACR 9
/ SW V:16).  The far more common alternative is seemingly one in which represented
object of volition is given from elsewhere, as “presupposed from theoretical philosophy” (
ACR 9 / SW V:16). 
56  The system of theoretical philosophy in the background here is, unsurprisingly, that of
Kant’s first Critique. For supposing the object of volition is not spontaneously produced, it
will be an empirical object of inner sense. To return to the simple example above, my
imagined representation of the soup is not possible from pure concepts and forms of
intuition alone. It depends on what has actually been given to one in sensation.20 
57  Here,  Fichte  takes  up  the  basic  line  of  questioning  of  the  Gebhard  review.  The
representation in question stands under logical and transcendental laws. But it is not a
product of spontaneous action. For the forms of intuition and the categories, by Kant’s
lights, are simply not up for our spontaneous determination. Instead, they themselves are
spontaneous  in  the  much  more  minimal  sense  of  synthesizing  given  manifolds  of
representation. Yet this empirical synthesis – as Kant would be the first to stress – is
“applied to...objects with the feeling of necessity,” rather than by way of self-conscious
representation or autonomy (ACR 15 / SW V:23).
58  As  Fichte  now  stresses,  so-called  empirical  spontaneity  is  merely  an  absence  of
representational determination by sensations or instincts. Yet these non-rational factors
might continue to play a crucial role in determining motivation. 
59  Nor can its standing under theoretical rules really explain its motivational role, which
seemingly can only be referred to a primitive natural drive (albeit one that we are not
conscious of). Again, consider my anticipation of the soup that will satisfy my hunger.
What  is  motivationally  essential  is  not  the  theoretical  representation but  desire  and
anticipation of future pleasure.
60  This need not be a problem for simple natural desires, such as hunger. It does become an
issue if the representation in question is that of one’s happiest possible life. For however
one determines this state of affairs theoretically, its motivational role remains unclear. (To
take a broadly Wolffian example, the ‘perfection’ of a state of affairs does not, seemingly,
entail anything about its motivational role for me.) Moreover, it therefore seems that
one’s final end is merely a naturally determined fact, no different from the way in which
our palate is tickled by hunger. That is, Fichte seems to be suggesting that apart from the
case of spontaneity, inclinations determine the will in virtue of some future pleasure.
This  hedonistic  view of  motivation outside of  the pure moral  case is  also frequently
attributed to Kant.21
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61  Fichte adopts a surprising solution to the motivational problem. For he denies that finite
beings like us are ever capable of “pure volition” (ACR 23 / SW V:33) That is, to return to
his  distinction  between  the  representational  object  of  volition  and  the  conative
determination towards it, only a divine being could spontaneously produce both these
aspects.
62  Instead, for Fichte, pure practical reason does involve a grasp of the absolutely right.
This is what Kant describes as the legislative or objective aspect of autonomy. Indeed, it
seems  that  Fichte  here  remains  deeply  Kantian,  in  that  he  does  not  explicate  pure
practical reason in virtue of features of self-consciousness, but with respect to something
like the moral law.
63  Yet since we are empirical beings, such a representation cannot automatically determine
us to act, but must be combined with an empirical spring of action. That is, for finite
beings  like  us,  legislative  autonomy  involves  spontaneous  representational
determination.  A  perfectly  rational  being  would  likewise  be  determined  to  act  in
accordance with the moral law; for such a being “no choice, no selection among different
determinations” takes place (ACR 22 / SW V:32). Finite beings like us, by contrast, are not
fully conatively determined, but are subject to competing impulses, including an impulse
of respect for the moral law. 
64  Notably, Fichte here does not attempt to prove, on the basis of mere features of self-
consciousness, the existence of a rich positive conception of autonomy. As such,22 it is far
from clear that Fichte took the problems surrounding autonomy to be easily solved by
appealing to the features of a unifying subjectivity. 
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NOTES
1. For an overview of issues in Fichte’s Doctrine of Ethics, see Goh (2012). Henrich (1982) is a classic
account  of  the  relationship  between  Kantian  autonomy  and  the  texts  of  Fichte’s  earlier
Wissenschaftslehre. 
2. See Neuhouser (1990, 20).
3. Engstrom (1988) calls these objective and subjective autonomy, respectively.
4. Compare  Reinhold’s  claim  that  the  material  foundations  of  his  philosophical  system  is
“consciousness as an actual fact” (FKtH 84).
5. Complicating the issue further is Fichte’s difficult conception of ‘feeling’ (Gefühl). Fichte takes
note  of  Kant’s  distinction,  in  the  third  Critique,  between  sensation  and  mere feeling.  Kant’s
discussion  is  itself  extremely  cryptic,  but  suggests  that  sensations  are  essentially  able  to  be
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constitutively involved in the intuitive representation of extramental objects. Feelings have an
essential subjectivity that precludes this constitutive role. Fichte’s very helpful notes on his 1795
Grundriss suggest that a subjective feeling is transformed into an indeterminate quasi-object of
sensation through something like synthesis (GA II/4, 360ff.). This synthetic process continues in
construing the sensation as having at least minimal determinate properties. Elsewhere Fichte
notes that infants have not yet developed their constructive abilities, so they still live in a world
of  feeling  rather  than  a  material  world  (EPW 202).  Elsewhere,  Fichte  is  unfortunately  not
linguistically consistent regarding feeling/sensation/matter.
6. See CPrR 5:24.
7. See SoE 15ff.
8. See e.g. the opening of Fichte’s System of Ethics (“reason cannot get outside of itself,” SoE 23),
and Pippin (2000).
9. See Hall (2016).
10. See Druet (1972) and, for a helpful survey of interpretations, Breazeale (2013).
11. Pippin (2000, 156) has rightly stressed the early Fichte’s emphasis on “the self-sufficiency or
autonomy of...the normative domain itself.” While I am broadly in agreement with Pippin’s claim, it
must be stressed that in ordinary life, as opposed to transcendental philosophy, the normative
domain is definitely not self-sufficient in this way. Though the empirical stance is of course a
rational undertaking, its objects need not be in anything like the normative domain. Moreover,
unlike  some  of  his  recent  interpreters,  Fichte  is  not  committed  to  anything  like  the
unintelligibility or obvious inconsistency of common-sense or popular-philosophical standpoints.
12. See Ameriks (2000). 
13. See Guéroult (1920) and Zöller (2007). 
14. See Opus Postumum 22:20-95 and Emundts (2004).
15. See SW VIII:418-26. I follow Breazeale’s translation (Fichte (2001)).
16. See e.g. Hume’s Principles of Morals, IX.6. 
17. This could seem too hasty, given Kant’s insistence on the interests even of theoretical reason.
However,  Fichte  might  reply  that  by  Kant’s  own admission,  all  interest  is  practical.  Thus,  it
cannot be due to theoretical reason alone. This leaves open whether it is ultimately grounded in
practical reason, or in some Smithian/Humean drive.
18. See Henrich (1982). Like many other interpreters, he views the Kant of the second Critique as
decisively moving away from any attempt to prove the motivational force of pure reason on the
basis  of  a  prior  conception  of  spontaneity  (e.g.,  the  spontaneity  of  theoretical  reason).  By
contrast, Ware (2017) stresses the continuity between the account in the second Critique – with its
appeal  to  a  ‘fact  of  reason’  –  and  the  earlier  deduction  in  the  Groundwork.  For  that  earlier
argument already depends on a notion of pure practical law, just as in Kant’s later appeal to the
fact of reason. 
19. It might be that in logic, one is determined in some sense by theoretical representations – but
it  does  not  seem that  this  involves  the direct  determination of  the will (as  opposed to,  e.g.,
judgment). 
20. Kant writes:  “Once sensation is  given...then through its  manifold many an object  can be
invented in imagination that has no empirical place outside imagination in space and time” (CPR
A374; compare B278-9).
21. For a dissenting view, see Reath (2006).
22. Pace Henrich (1982). 
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ABSTRACTS
Fichte's mature conception of transcendental freedom is the subject of some controversy. This
paper hopes to shed light on Fichte's later conception by examining his earliest thoughts on the
matter. The focus is on three pivotal years of Fichte's development between 1791 and 1793: A.
1791: Fichte’s Earliest Account of Freedom; B. 1792: Two Reviews and Fichte’s Doubts; C. 1793:
Fichte’s Revised Account of Freedom. The paper begins with a discussion of Fichte's reflections
on how a broadly Kantian conception of transcendental freedom can be manifest in the empirical
world. Then the paper examines several short works from 1792 in which Fichte's views become
significantly more sophisticated. It will be shown that Fichte confronts in these works the worry
that  neither  a  metaphysical  account  of  the  natural  world,  nor  a  mere  appeal  to  ‘facts  of
consciousness,’ can be sufficient to establish autonomy in the positive sense. It will be argued
that Fichte responds to these worries in two ways. One, relatively well known, is his attempt to
prove the existence of practical reason from features of self-consciousness. The paper will focus
instead on Fichte's account of moral motivation added to the 1793 second edition of the Attempt
at a Critique of all Revelation. There, Fichte sketches an account of pure practical motivation that
does not depend on direct appeal to features of self-consciousness, but is more in line with Kant's
own appeal to the moral law.
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